Another misguided appeal was decided by Aldridge, Carew & Behrens JJ in Kostić & Vaughan (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 221. In that matter both the applicant and second respondent were self-represented litigants whilst the first respondent and the ICL filed submitting notices.
It could be said that there is a tremendous amount of time wasted on proceedings that should never have been filed and/or were doomed to failure from the outset. For the most part this seems to be from self-represented litigants, many of whom simply can’t afford the ongoing costs of litigation. One such case was that of Conner & Conner (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 223, an Appeal from a decision of a Division 1 Judge.
Peusen & Belo (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 729 involved another example of a legal practitioner being referred, in this case to the Queensland Legal Services Commission, as a result of conduct deemed unacceptable by the Court.
The use of AI is becoming popular, perhaps too popular, and very controversial of late. We have seen many situations of self-represented parties relying on AI but is it acceptable for members of the legal profession, particularly those who are highly qualified, to do so? The Full Court says that it is not.
Meidner [2025] FedCFamC1A 224, was an attempted appeal by the father, determined by His Honour, Campton J, on 11 December 2025, in Chambers on the papers. Because orders had been made on final hearing by the trial judge, declaring the father a vexatious litigant – more commonly known as a Harmful Proceedings order – it was necessary to file an Application in an Appeal, seeking leave to file the actual Appeal.
Costs of an appeal cannot be significant and often daunting, even more so if the appeal is later abandoned and a costs order made. If an appellant is legally represented it can be assumed that he/she has been informed of the costs consequences. That position is not so clear where the appellant is either self-represented from the start or becomes so during the proceedings.
The Courts are more and more having to accommodate self-represented parties which has become a lot more common over the years. It can be a fine line for the judiciary to ensure procedural fairness to all whilst not appearing to be advocating for the self-represented litigant. It will be an equally fine line to ensure the inclusion of that self-represented litigant who is essentially standing in the shoes of a legal representative.
Is the FCFCoA a user pays system as between a litigant and the Court? On,
13 November 2025, in Partington & Partington [2025] FedCFamC1A 208, Her Honour, Christie J, determined an Application in an Appeal in respect of an appeal from a decision of a Division 2 Judge. In the Division 2 proceedings Interim Parenting Orders had been made along with case management directions on
27 August 2025. The appellant father took issue with those Orders and filed an application for the Judge to recuse himself. At the time of the Application in an Appeal that recusal application had not been dealt with.
Those of us who have been practising for far too long will recall that prior to 28/12/2002 superannuation was not regarded as an asset available for division in family law property settlements. Rather, its value was taken into consideration at the adjustment stage as a financial resource. That sometimes resulted in an inequitable outcome in circumstances where the value of the superannuation was equal to or greater to the non-superannuation assets.
In any initial advice conference with a prospective client it is imperative to determine if that client has left it a little late and leave may be required to commence proceedings. If that is the case then time is of the essence in any leave application.
Another misguided appeal was decided by Aldridge, Carew & Behrens JJ in Kostić & Vaughan (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 221. In that matter both the applicant and second respondent were self-represented litigants whilst the first respondent and the ICL filed submitting notices.
It could be said that there is a tremendous amount of time wasted on proceedings that should never have been filed and/or were doomed to failure from the outset. For the most part this seems to be from self-represented litigants, many of whom simply can’t afford the ongoing costs of litigation. One such case was that of Conner & Conner (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 223, an Appeal from a decision of a Division 1 Judge.
Peusen & Belo (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 729 involved another example of a legal practitioner being referred, in this case to the Queensland Legal Services Commission, as a result of conduct deemed unacceptable by the Court.
The use of AI is becoming popular, perhaps too popular, and very controversial of late. We have seen many situations of self-represented parties relying on AI but is it acceptable for members of the legal profession, particularly those who are highly qualified, to do so? The Full Court says that it is not.
Meidner [2025] FedCFamC1A 224, was an attempted appeal by the father, determined by His Honour, Campton J, on 11 December 2025, in Chambers on the papers. Because orders had been made on final hearing by the trial judge, declaring the father a vexatious litigant – more commonly known as a Harmful Proceedings order – it was necessary to file an Application in an Appeal, seeking leave to file the actual Appeal.
Costs of an appeal cannot be significant and often daunting, even more so if the appeal is later abandoned and a costs order made. If an appellant is legally represented it can be assumed that he/she has been informed of the costs consequences. That position is not so clear where the appellant is either self-represented from the start or becomes so during the proceedings.
The Courts are more and more having to accommodate self-represented parties which has become a lot more common over the years. It can be a fine line for the judiciary to ensure procedural fairness to all whilst not appearing to be advocating for the self-represented litigant. It will be an equally fine line to ensure the inclusion of that self-represented litigant who is essentially standing in the shoes of a legal representative.
Is the FCFCoA a user pays system as between a litigant and the Court? On,
13 November 2025, in Partington & Partington [2025] FedCFamC1A 208, Her Honour, Christie J, determined an Application in an Appeal in respect of an appeal from a decision of a Division 2 Judge. In the Division 2 proceedings Interim Parenting Orders had been made along with case management directions on
27 August 2025. The appellant father took issue with those Orders and filed an application for the Judge to recuse himself. At the time of the Application in an Appeal that recusal application had not been dealt with.
Those of us who have been practising for far too long will recall that prior to 28/12/2002 superannuation was not regarded as an asset available for division in family law property settlements. Rather, its value was taken into consideration at the adjustment stage as a financial resource. That sometimes resulted in an inequitable outcome in circumstances where the value of the superannuation was equal to or greater to the non-superannuation assets.
In any initial advice conference with a prospective client it is imperative to determine if that client has left it a little late and leave may be required to commence proceedings. If that is the case then time is of the essence in any leave application.
