Practitioners and parties must carefully adhere to court-imposed filing deadlines and directions.
The appeal pathway from the FWCA is complex, and depends on the decision maker, the legislation, and whether the order is interlocutory or final. Most parenting orders will be interlocutory in nature, even if they appear to be final orders.
A conviction for breach of an interim family violence restraining order will constitute “an offence involving violence, or a threat of violence, to the other party” for the purpose of the mandatory cross examination ban in section 219AK(1)(c)(i) of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA) (which reflects section 102NA(1)(c)(i) of the Family Law Act 1975).
Whilst it is not unusual for a parent to want to revisit Orders that they are not happy with, and such attempts do not appear to have abated since the introduction of section 65DAAA to the Family Law Act, one would expect that it would take longer than three days for a change in circumstances to be established.
Whilst in parenting matters the decision as to whether or not to appeal can bring with it lots of emotion, on financial matters or costs some commercial commonsense is necessary. On 18 December 2025, in Beroni & Corelli [2025] FedCFamC1A 236, their Honours, Alstergren CJ, Hartnett & Curran JJ determined an Appeal (de facto husband) and Cross-Appeal (de facto wife), solely on the issue of costs orders made in Division 1 proceedings relating to the setting aside of a Binding Financial Agreement (“BFA”).
The fear of costs does, and should, also loom large for legal representatives. Failure to provide advice or the provision of incorrect advice can have serious financial ramifications for the legal representatives. One such situation arose on 12 December 2025 in the judgment of Fing & Ma (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 230. This was a full court decision of their honours, Aldridge, Campton & Christie JJ, in respect of an appeal.
Progressing a matter in a timely fashion is always important, not least of which that not doing so could increase a party’s costs. Kelly & Huber [2025] FedCFamC1A 237 His Honour, Aldridge J, determined an Application in an Appeal seeking reinstatement of an Appeal that had been abandoned by the failure to file a transcript on time.
Getting the Orders sought right, particularly if you want them to be enforced, is always important but even more so when it comes to superannuation. If a party seeks a split of superannuation then he/she must put the superannuation Trustee on notice, at least 28 days prior to any trial or the making of Orders. As His Honour, Schonell J, opined on 14 November 2025, in Hidaka & Hidaka (No 6) [2025] FedCFamC1F 822, not doing so could mean that you end up with entirely unenforceable Orders.
How does the Court deal with wastage when addbacks are no longer permitted. How can such wastage be quantified in terms of its impact on. the current asset pool available for distribution between the parties? In Chambers & Spillett (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 902, a Division 1, first instance decision on 15 December 2025, Her Honour, Carew J, somewhat curiously, dealt with this very issue.
Another misguided appeal was decided by Aldridge, Carew & Behrens JJ in Kostić & Vaughan (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 221. In that matter both the applicant and second respondent were self-represented litigants whilst the first respondent and the ICL filed submitting notices.
It could be said that there is a tremendous amount of time wasted on proceedings that should never have been filed and/or were doomed to failure from the outset. For the most part this seems to be from self-represented litigants, many of whom simply can’t afford the ongoing costs of litigation. One such case was that of Conner & Conner (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 223, an Appeal from a decision of a Division 1 Judge.
Practitioners and parties must carefully adhere to court-imposed filing deadlines and directions.
The appeal pathway from the FWCA is complex, and depends on the decision maker, the legislation, and whether the order is interlocutory or final. Most parenting orders will be interlocutory in nature, even if they appear to be final orders.
A conviction for breach of an interim family violence restraining order will constitute “an offence involving violence, or a threat of violence, to the other party” for the purpose of the mandatory cross examination ban in section 219AK(1)(c)(i) of the Family Court Act 1997 (WA) (which reflects section 102NA(1)(c)(i) of the Family Law Act 1975).
Whilst it is not unusual for a parent to want to revisit Orders that they are not happy with, and such attempts do not appear to have abated since the introduction of section 65DAAA to the Family Law Act, one would expect that it would take longer than three days for a change in circumstances to be established.
Whilst in parenting matters the decision as to whether or not to appeal can bring with it lots of emotion, on financial matters or costs some commercial commonsense is necessary. On 18 December 2025, in Beroni & Corelli [2025] FedCFamC1A 236, their Honours, Alstergren CJ, Hartnett & Curran JJ determined an Appeal (de facto husband) and Cross-Appeal (de facto wife), solely on the issue of costs orders made in Division 1 proceedings relating to the setting aside of a Binding Financial Agreement (“BFA”).
The fear of costs does, and should, also loom large for legal representatives. Failure to provide advice or the provision of incorrect advice can have serious financial ramifications for the legal representatives. One such situation arose on 12 December 2025 in the judgment of Fing & Ma (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 230. This was a full court decision of their honours, Aldridge, Campton & Christie JJ, in respect of an appeal.
Progressing a matter in a timely fashion is always important, not least of which that not doing so could increase a party’s costs. Kelly & Huber [2025] FedCFamC1A 237 His Honour, Aldridge J, determined an Application in an Appeal seeking reinstatement of an Appeal that had been abandoned by the failure to file a transcript on time.
Getting the Orders sought right, particularly if you want them to be enforced, is always important but even more so when it comes to superannuation. If a party seeks a split of superannuation then he/she must put the superannuation Trustee on notice, at least 28 days prior to any trial or the making of Orders. As His Honour, Schonell J, opined on 14 November 2025, in Hidaka & Hidaka (No 6) [2025] FedCFamC1F 822, not doing so could mean that you end up with entirely unenforceable Orders.
How does the Court deal with wastage when addbacks are no longer permitted. How can such wastage be quantified in terms of its impact on. the current asset pool available for distribution between the parties? In Chambers & Spillett (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 902, a Division 1, first instance decision on 15 December 2025, Her Honour, Carew J, somewhat curiously, dealt with this very issue.
Another misguided appeal was decided by Aldridge, Carew & Behrens JJ in Kostić & Vaughan (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 221. In that matter both the applicant and second respondent were self-represented litigants whilst the first respondent and the ICL filed submitting notices.
It could be said that there is a tremendous amount of time wasted on proceedings that should never have been filed and/or were doomed to failure from the outset. For the most part this seems to be from self-represented litigants, many of whom simply can’t afford the ongoing costs of litigation. One such case was that of Conner & Conner (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 223, an Appeal from a decision of a Division 1 Judge.
