Case Summary

Gaddy & Gaddy (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1245

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)•Suthers J•14 August 2026

Parenting Section 65DAAA Rice and Asplund Harmful Proceedings Order Section 102QAC

A mother’s application to reconsider final parenting orders failed for want of a significant change in circumstances, and the Court went on to make harmful proceedings orders against her.

“

“To be clear, through the prism of having to make a parenting order - the test for making positive findings about family violence and/or the prospective assessment of whether there is an unacceptable risk posed to the safety of a child are different to the investigation required in accordance with s 102QAC(2).”

at [69]

Summary

After years of protracted family law litigation which had been finalised by a defended trial, the mother sought reconsideration of the final parenting orders made in respect of the parties’ three children. The father resisted the application and sought orders restraining the mother from commencing any further parenting proceeding without the Court first considering the prospective application in his absence.

On the threshold question the Court applied s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as interpreted by the Full Court in Radecki, where Austin and Williams JJ concluded that “consider” should not be given a literal meaning but requires the Court to contemplate the evidence and make findings, and Carew J explained that the applicant’s evidence is taken at its highest, but only for the purposes of the application. The matters the mother relied on as significant changed circumstances, including ongoing mental health concerns, a lack of insight, continued contraventions of apprehended domestic violence orders, breaches of bail and police intervention, were consistent with the findings which underpinned the final orders. The Court could not find that a significant change of circumstances had occurred and dismissed the mother’s initiating application.

The Court then made harmful proceedings orders, emphasising that the investigation required by s 102QAC(2) is different from the test for making positive findings about family violence and from the prospective assessment of unacceptable risk which applies when making a parenting order. It also made orders addressing the mother’s persistent, repetitive and voluminous communications with the Court, noting that those orders protected the administrative processes of the Court from being overwhelmed and did not affect the operation of the harmful proceedings orders themselves. Those orders were made under s 140 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), r 1.31 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), the Court’s implied power to protect the integrity of its own processes and prevent their abuse, s 95 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) dealing with the overarching purpose, and s 192 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth). See [96] to [98].

Key Takeaways

✓

Section 65DAAA codifies Rice and Asplund without inviting a literal reading. The Full Court in Radecki held that “consider” requires the Court to contemplate the evidence and make findings. See [21].

✓

Evidence is taken at its highest, but only for this purpose. The applicant’s account is assumed for the purposes of the threshold application, not accepted for the proceeding. See [22].

✓

Repetition of what was already found is not change. Matters consistent with the findings that underpinned the final orders will not establish a significant change of circumstances. See [56] to [59].

✓

The harmful proceedings test stands apart. The investigation under s 102QAC(2) is different from the family violence and unacceptable risk assessments made when framing a parenting order. See [69].

✓

Court communications can be managed separately. Orders addressing persistent and voluminous correspondence rest on a different set of powers and protect the Court’s administrative processes without affecting the harmful proceedings orders. See [91] and [96] to [98].